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Recent Developments

Valentine v. On Target, Inc.
A Gun Retailer Does Not Owe a Duty to a Murder Victim when Its Stolen
Handgun Is Used to Commit a Murder
By Jennifer Golub

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a gun
retailer, from whose store a gun was
stolen and used in the commission of
a murder, owed no duty to the murder
victim to prevent the theft and criminal
misuse ofthe gun. Valentine v. On
Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 727 A.2d
947 (1999). To impose an indefinite
duty on gun merchants to the general
public, the court explained, would be
tantamount to regulating the market,
a responsibility reserved for the
legislature. The court's holding was
confined to the specific facts and
allegations pled by the petitioner.
In July 1993, Edward Wendell
McLeod and another stole several
handguns from On Target, Inc. ("On
Target"), a gun retailer in Anne
Arundel County. In September of
that year, Joanne Valentine
("Valentine") was murdered by an
''unknown assailant" using one ofthe
handguns stolen from On Target.
Vincent Valentine ("Petitioner''),
personal representative, surviving
spouse, and next friend of their
children, filed a wrongful death suit
against On Target in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County. Petitioner
alleged that On Target breached its
duty to the deceased in several ways,
ranging from failing to properly train
its employees to failing to properly
secure the handguns.
The trial court granted On

Target's motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Maryland
Rule 2-322(b)(2). The petitioner
appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals ofMaryland, which affirmed
the trial court's dismissal but on
different grounds. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari and affinned.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by narrowing the issue to
whether On Target owed Valentine a
duty based on the facts particular to
the case at hand. Valentine, 353 Md.
at 550, 727 A.2d at 950. For
example, the court noted that the
petitioner alleged that respondent
owed a duty to exercise reasonable
care in the display of handguns, yet
Petitioner did not set forth how the
handguns were displayed. Id. at 547,
727 A.2d at 948.
The court identified the
applicable legal standard of care a
plaintiffmust set forth in a negligence
complaint to be "reasonable conduct
in the light of the apparent risk." Id.
at 550, 727 A.2d at 950 (quoting W.
PAGE KEETON ET.

AL., PROSSER AND

§ 30,
at 356 (5 th Ed. 1984)). Likewise,
sustaining a cause of action in
negligence requires a "legally
recognized duty" owed by the
defendant to the plaintiffor to a group
of plaintiffs. Id. at 549, 727 A.2d at
949.

KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

The court explained that the
policy reason for allowing a cause of
action in negligence is to discourage
or encourage specific behaviors by
one person for the benefit of another.
Id. at 550, 727 A.2d at 950.
According to the court, no purpose
is achieved if the creation of a duty
does not benefit the plaintiff. Id.
In the instant case, the court
applied two "concepts," which create
the existence ofa duty: "relationship
or nexus of the parties and
foreseeability." Id. at 550-51, 727
A.2d at 950. Foreseeablity, the court
stated, is the notion that one should
not be liable for ''unreasonably remote
consequences." Id.at551, 727 A.2d
at 950 (citing Rosenblatt v. Exxon,
335 Md. 58, 77, 642A.2d 180, 189
(1994)). The court expressed that
Petitioner did not allege that On
Target knew or should have known
that guns would be stolen from the
store or that an "unknown party"
would obtain a stolen gun and use it
to commit a crime. Id. The court
explained that imposing a duty based
on a general notion that it was
foreseeable that guns would be used
to commit crimes would equate to
imposing a duty based on "an
imprecise notion of a foreseeability
of risk of harm to the public in
general." Id. The court noted that
other factors, such as intervening
parties or circumstances, must be
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considered before any and all
foreseeable harm creates a duty. Id.
Relying on its previous decision
in Scott v. Watson, which held that
"a private person is under no special
duty to protect another from the
criminal acts of a third person," the
court concluded that one cannot be
expected to owe a duty to the entire
world to protect it from harm caused
by third persons. Id. at 551-53, 727
A.2d at 950-51(citing Scott v.
Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166, 359
A.2d 548,552 (1976)). Requiring a
duty, such as that proposed by
Petitioner, to an "indeterminate class
of people, known and unknown"
would create a "tremendous burden
on shop owners while providing only
a hypothetical benefit to the public at
best." Id. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951.
The court distinguished cases
cited by Petitioner in support of his
argument and noted that the cases
were either factually distinguishable,
or their rationales were not ones the
court was prepared to recognize. Id.
at 553-56, 727 A.2d at 951-52
(citing Estate of Strever v. Cline,
924 P .2d 666 (Mont. 1996);
Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc.,
637 N .E.2d 404 (Ohio App.3d
1994); Berly v. D & L Security
Services and Investigations, Inc.,
876 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.Ct.App.
1994)).
The court concluded that finding
a duty in this case would create an
improper cause of action. Id. at 556,
727 A.2d at 952-53. The court,
however, noted that this holding did
not mean that gun store owners can
never be liable for negligent displays
or sales of guns. Id. at 556, 727 A.2d

at 953. The court reiterated public
policy as the basis for its decision and
noted that to impose a duty on gun
shop owners would, in effect, be
regulating merchants, a role reserved
for the legislature. Id.
Judge Raker, in her concurrence
in which Chief Judge Bell and Judge
Eldridge joined, agreed with the
majority's holding, based on
insufficiency of the pleading. Id.
However, she disagreed with the
majority's analysis that shop owners
do not owe a duty to exercise
ordinary care in securing, displaying,
and selling handguns. Id. at 560, 727
A.2d at 955. Judge Raker explained
that it is foreseeable that when a
handgun is improperly secured it may
be used in the commission ofa crime,
and therefore a duty should attach. Id.
at 561, 727 A.2d at 955. She also
noted that if shop owners knew they
could be subjected to liability, they
might exercise extra care in the sale
of handguns. Id. at 565, 727 A.2d at
957.
The holding in this case reflects
the divisive issue of who is to blame
when innocent people are hurt by
stolen guns. Petitioner alleged that On
Target owed a duty to exercise
reasonable care, yet Petitioner did not
show how On Target breached its
duty. This case is one of the first in
Mary land in a national trend of suits
against gun retailers and
manufacturers. The impression given
in this opinion by the Court ofAppeals
of Maryland is that under slightly
dfferent facts and pleadings, a duty
to exercise reasonable care may be
found. Judge Raker's concurrence
reads more like a dissent and, in the

near future, the court may find that her
statements resonate public opinion
and the growing trend regarding
liability when guns stolen from retailers
are used in the commission ofa crime.
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